Western Flags for Ukrainian Merchant Ships: The Plan Russia Fears

TVS News AI, editorially supervised, presents Western Flags for Ukrainian Merchant Ships: The Plan Russia Fears.

Since July, Russia has been deliberately attacking merchant ships in the Black Sea. Ukraine is losing an economic lifeline – up to half of its agricultural exports are at stake. The port of Odessa, the country's gateway to the world, is becoming the playing field for a new phase of the war.

Why Shipowners Are Already Staying Away

Russia doesn't have to sink every ship that calls at a Ukrainian port. It is enough to make the voyage dangerous enough that no one dares to attempt it. That is exactly what has happened since July: The attacks threaten a supply line that is vital for Ukraine's war effort and for global food security. Low water levels on the Danube and limited land corridors leave Kyiv with few alternatives. If the sea remains blocked, the consequences would be felt beyond the country's borders – including rising food prices worldwide.

The Idea: Flags of Inconvenience

Two authors – Jade McGlynn of King's College London and Tennyson Dearing of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy – propose putting Ukrainian freighters under Western flags: from the Liberian flag of convenience, for example, to the French tricolor or the British Red Ensign. Ukraine's partners could allow suitable ships to enter their registers, subject to national rules. It sounds like a bureaucratic change, but it is a political signal with calculation behind it.

Why This Should Deter Russia

A Western flag raises the political and economic costs of an attack. If Russia attacks a ship under the French or British flag, the flag state is diplomatically on the hook – with explanations, sanctions, possible escalation. The Gulf War showed how it can work: In 1987, the United States registered eleven Kuwaiti tankers as US ships; Operation Earnest Will escorted them through the Persian Gulf – the largest convoy operation of the US Navy since World War II. However, the reflagged tanker Bridgeton hit an Iranian mine on the very first convoy. A flag alone does not make a ship invulnerable.

Insurance as a Second Lever

For shipowners to call at Ukrainian ports again, more than a new ship registry is needed. In 2023, the Ukrainian government and insurance broker Marsh McLennan launched the Unity facility, backed by Lloyd's insurers for war risks on grain shipments. The following year, it was extended to non-military cargo. European governments could examine whether they support a similar model for ships under their flag – and thus make the risk manageable for shipowners.

The Price of Deterrence

For this to work, Europe must be willing to shoulder part of the risk. Ukraine currently bears a significant share of the immediate risk in defending Europe – its partners provide enormous resources but have limited their own exposure. The "Coalition of the Willing" under France and Britain has already committed to helping secure the maritime areas after a future ceasefire. The authors propose beginning now with the legal and commercial setup of a joint merchant fleet – and thereby answering President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's call for foreign ships to transport grain from Ukraine.

Why a Ceasefire Alone Is Not Enough

The first Black Sea agreement from July 2022 held until Moscow withdrew a year later. A new ceasefire could be just as fragile. The initiative must therefore not depend on Russian cooperation. A ceasefire, as proposed by Turkey and the United Nations, would still be a useful starting point: Western-flagged ships could set sail without immediately testing the deal. At the same time, it raises the bar for Moscow – breaking a ceasefire to attack a Western-flagged ship is a bigger step than during active fighting.

What Europe Must Decide Now

For the deterrence to take effect, the flag states must agree in advance on how they will respond to an attack – with additional sanctions, more support for Ukraine, or diplomatic pressure. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte had emphasized in September that responses did not always have to be symmetrical or even public – but Russia must know that a hit comes with costs. Without credible, agreed commitments, an attack would be followed first by a debate about the response – exactly the delay Moscow wants to provoke. In the end, the authors argue, the question is not what Vladimir Putin might do next. It is what Europe does to change his calculation.