Merz in South Korea: Free Trade Against Supply Chain Dependence

TVS News AI, editorially supervised, presents Merz in South Korea: Free Trade Against Supply Chain Dependence.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz concluded his five-day trip to Asia in Seoul by advocating a global network of free trade. At the opening of the Asia-Pacific conference of the German economy, he said geopolitical changes were bringing like-minded partners closer together. The conference is attended by around 1,000 business representatives from Germany and the Indo-Pacific region.

Merz declared: “We are joining together decisively against unilateralism, autocratic power politics and violations of international law.” That was the concrete political message of his appearance: Free trade should be organized in an alliance that not only moves goods but also defends shared rules against economic pressure.

Der Spiegel reports that numerous corporate agreements are due to be signed on the sidelines of the visit, particularly in the startup and AI sectors. This means that, alongside the geopolitical network, an economic focus was also on the agenda.

Merz Warns Against Supply Chains as Instruments of Political Pressure

The specific risk

Merz directly linked his free-trade initiative to concrete examples of economic coercion. “When supply chains become political pawns, when access to key technologies is obstructed or when efforts to secure raw materials serve more as a display of power than as fair partnership, this endangers growth, prosperity and ultimately the security of entire regions,” he said.

It was therefore no longer just about tariffs or simplifying deliveries. Merz placed three concrete risks side by side: politically instrumentalized supply chains, obstructed access to key technologies and a partnership in raw materials that is not perceived as equal. In the report, such trading practices are primarily accused of China.

The strongest counterargument lies in the breadth of this criticism: It covers several possible interventions in global trade without clearly identifying any single country or measure in the report. The political direction is therefore certain, but its eventual implementation is not. Der Spiegel names neither any network members beyond the actors presented nor a binding launch date.

A Network Alongside the WTO and Stronger EU Agreements

The trade-policy architecture

Merz once again proposed an alliance of states for free world trade. It is to be created alongside the “largely incapable of acting World Trade Organization.” At the same time, he advocated closer links among the European Union's numerous free-trade agreements.

As possible partners for new agreements, he named blocs of states such as ASEAN or the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In doing so, he pursued two levels at once: a network that should be based on shared international rules and closer connections among the EU's existing free-trade agreements.

For Merz, South Korea was not the only place where he presented this idea. He had already advocated a global free-trade network in Singapore and Japan during the same trip to Asia. South Korea was the final stop. Against this backdrop, South Korea's open stance takes on added significance because it does not concern merely a single bilateral contact.

The benefit of this broad approach is a common line of defense against unilateralism and violations of international law. The open question is how such a network would cooperate with the WTO and what rules would apply to new member states. The report does not yet elaborate on this.

South Korea Identifies Three Concrete Areas of Cooperation

What Han Seong Sook specifically names

South Korean Prime Minister Han Seong Sook openly expressed her willingness to cooperate with Germany at the conference. She cited the country's role for German companies as the reason: “German companies use Korea as a central hub to expand their presence in the Asia-Pacific region.” Against the backdrop of profound changes in the global economy, global networking, she said, is becoming increasingly important.

Han did not describe South Korea's interest in general terms, but named three areas:

• Battery production
• Semiconductors
• AI-enabled transformation of industrial production

South Korea's openness therefore goes beyond an unspecified political endorsement. The three areas show which economic links Han currently considers particularly important. However, they do not yet indicate which projects will be agreed upon, which companies will be involved or how the cooperation will be funded.

This operational dimension becomes particularly visible on the sidelines of the conference: The startup and AI sectors were explicitly identified for the signing of numerous corporate agreements. Such agreements would be closer to the existing economic structure than a purely constitutional free-trade alliance. Der Spiegel, however, does not report on any individual agreements, participants or sums.

What the Conference Concretely Does — and What Is Still Missing

A political launch rather than a finished network

The appearance provides three solid points: Merz proposed a network based on shared international rules, South Korea sees opportunities for cooperation in batteries, semiconductors and AI-enabled industrial production, and numerous corporate agreements are due to be concluded on the sidelines of the conference.

This is not yet enough for a reliable assessment. The report names neither the members of a possible network nor a timetable or concrete measures to address the risks described. The individual partners and contents of the promised or signed startup and AI agreements also remain unclear.

The story is therefore primarily a political launch. The direction is clear: Germany is proposing a more interconnected free-trade system, and South Korea has identified areas where cooperation could become tangible. Whether this produces a viable network with binding rules will be determined by the partners and instruments that have yet to be named.